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Abstract
The business enterprise in the real world wrestles with fundamental uncertainty
and instability. Key enterprise decisions such as pricing, financing, and invest-
ment are thus made strategically rather than optimally. Heterodox economists
are, however, divided in the account of business enterprise’s financing behav-
ior; macroeconomists put an emphasis on external financing, whereas microe-
conomists on internal financing. Moreover, they often stop short of establishing
a link between the two. Drawing upon the social provisioning perspective, this
essay aims at providing a new light on financing focusing on strategic enterprise
decision-making mechanisms.
Keywords: Business enterprise, pricing, financing, investment, uncertainty, instabil-
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1 Introduction: Uncertainty and the Social Provi-
sioning Process
Uncertainty in the historical time is too obvious to ignore. Economists have long wres-
tled with uncertainty in constructing a sensible economic theory. Taking uncertainty
into account indeed makes a theory indeterminate and complicated. Should a model
begin and end up with an equilibrium state, uncertainty is to be converted into some-
thing readily calculable (that is, risk in a probabilistic sense), or to be completely
abandoned as if uncertainty does not exist. The latter is precisely the case of the
efficient market theory in which rational individuals have perfect information (see, for
example, Fama 1965). New Classical economists and New Keynesians, among others,
have relaxed a firm belief in perfect information in order to explain abnormalities rou-
tinely happening in “efficient” markets. In their models, rational agents with bounded
rationality make errors, whereas the model is assumed to be consistent and correct
regardless of agents’ errors. With this relaxed assumption as to uncertainty, the core
propositions of neoclassical economics, such as rational individuals, the equilibrium
concept, market clearing, and market stability remain intact or even reinforced. This
is the reality upside down from the heterodox economics perspective (Crotty 1996;
Minsky 1996; Henry 2012).
Some conceptual clarifications are in order. Firstly, risk and uncertainty, although
they are interchangeable in neoclassical-mainstream economics, are different as well
as interactive in a significant sense. Riskiness is an acting person’s subjective evalu-
ation of external and future economic conditions, while uncertainty is a fact of life,
regardless of the amount or asymmetry of information held by acting persons, in the
sense that the future is unknown as well as unknowable. Uncertainty has nothing to
do with probability (Keynes 1936, 148, fn. 1; Davidson 2010). Of course, the degree
of uncertainty varies. Keynes also notes that “[t]he expectation of life is only slightly
uncertain. Even the weather is only moderately uncertain” (Keynes 1937, 213-4). Such
a concept of uncertainty has led Post Keynesians, among other heterodox economists,
to develop their theory that is radically different from mainstream theory. To highlight
the point that is relevant for the present discussion, all economic activities including
business activities are thus situated in the monetary production economy. Optimizing
behaviors are not possible under such radical uncertainty. Similarly, some others point
out that uncertainty is conditional in the sense that there is a degree of uncertainty
that is institutionally and historically contingent (Crotty 1996). In the latter sense of
uncertainty, agency with socio-economic power becomes sine qua non.1 And it does
not mean at all that uncertainty can be reduced to or interchangeable with risk as in
neoclassical theory.
1Such power stems from the hierarchical structure of society. In other words, classless and con-
flictless markets as in neoclassical economics are inconceivable under capitalism.
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Secondly, bounded rationality in neoclassical economics is “substantial rationality” in
the sense that rational individuals are constrained by limited information in addition
to conventional “known-with-certainty” constraints in the optimizing models. Some
heterodox economists tend to use the term bounded rationality that is, following Hebert
A. Simon (1976; 1987), synonymous with “procedural rationality” (Lavoie 1992, 51-4).
To avoid possible confusions, heterodox economists might stop using an analytically
meaningless term ‘rationality’ and, instead, use strategic or deliberate behaviors under
fundamental uncertainty.
Once historical time and radial uncertainty is taken seriously, such concepts as cu-
mulative causation, a strategic decision-making process, the evolution of institutions,
the accumulation of capital, agency, and the going concern are placed at the center
of economic theory. To use a succinct phrase that is consistent with the theoretical-
methodological core of heterodox economics, economics is the study of the social provi-
sioning process that is in its nature monetary and class-based. It follows that strategic
economic decisions and behaviors are put in the socio-historical context—institutions,
rules, conventions, cultures, values, ideologies, social relationships, and social classes.
That future is fundamentally uncertain and transmutable requires strategic and delib-
erate decisions and actions made by agency qua acting persons (as opposed to asocial
optimizing individuals) for them to survive, grow and reproduce over time. In order
for agency to achieve such goals actions need power and control. And the latter is ren-
dered available in the hierarchical class society. In other words, the capitalist society
requires a hierarchical class system in which one dominant class (that is, the capitalist
class and the state) controls the social provisioning process (Gruchy 1987; Henry 2012;
Jo 2011b; Lee 2011b; Lee and Jo 2011).
The analysis of the social provisioning process as a whole involves agency, structure,
and causal mechanisms. The interaction between them is radically uncertain in two
fundamental senses; one being that agency maintains or changes the existing structures
by way of causal mechanisms and hence the path of the provisioning process is open,
and another being that they are denominated in money or the credit-debt relation that
is in its nature uncertain in terms of value (Lawson 2003; Wray 2004).2 In this regard,
the social provisioning process in historical time is open and uncertain without any
deterministic or stable equilibrium state. Implied too is the irrelevance of the micro-
macro “dichotomy” as a conceptual demarcation of economics. Economy is an organic
whole reproduced and transformed by historical interactions between agency, struc-
tures, and mechanisms and thereby is to be neither aggregated nor disaggregated. In
order to understand the role of the business enterprise in the capitalist system, there-
fore, it is necessary to understand its strategic actions (such as, pricing, investment,
2If certainty is assumed, there should be no difference between expected profits and actual profits,
and between ex ante rates of return and ex post rates. The latter implies that the rates of return
must be the same for all the shares in the market under certainty (Wood 1975, 34-36).
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financing) conditioned by the structures of production, technology, and industry as
well as its outcomes (such as wage and profit, employment, output, and income distri-
bution). Thus the interaction between different levels (that is, the whole system and
sub-systems) through causal mechanisms undertaken by agency, rather than the arti-
ficial demarcation, would offer more comprehensive and realistic historical narratives
(Lee 2002; 2011b; Jo 2011b).
From this vantage point, the present research delves into enterprise investment and
finance that are, according to most heterodox traditions, the most important decisions
because they are chiefly associated with the accumulation of the capital, business cycles
and crises, and the protection and reproduction of the social classes. One theoretical
issue around investment and finance is that strategic investment and financing deci-
sions escape many heterodox economists’ notice. As a result, financing is mainly looked
through the operation of the financial market in which the supply of and demand for
funds are coordinated by the prices of funds. While such an approach has offered
important implications with regard to financial instability and business cycles, it is
based upon the problematic supply-demand framework or neoclassical microfounda-
tions. Keynes (1936) and many Post Keynesian macroeconomists are not completely
free of such a criticism. So it is argued in the paper that that heterodox theory of
investment and finance needs proper microfoundations of investment and finance so
as to offer better explanations of investment and financing decisions situated in the
uncertain and unstable social provisioning process.3
The following section delineates the monetary social provisioning process focusing on
the enterprise decision-making process. The next section explores financing and in-
vestment under uncertainty and instability. It is argued in this section that internal
financing as part of strategic enterprise decisions to survive and grow over time is
more significant than external financing. And its importance is amplified as instability
increases. The last section concludes.
3It should be noted that microfoundations based on heterodox (micro)economics have nothing to do
with neoclassical microfoundations. The term microfoundations used in the paper is to be understood
as heterodox microfoundations of macroeconomic outcomes (see, Jo 2007; Lee 2011a).
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2 The Business Enterprise in the Monetary Social
Provisioning Process
2.1 Enterprise decisions are technical, historical, and social
The business enterprise drives and sets the pace of the social provisioning process by
making both routine and momentous decisions that are technical, historical, and social
in their character.4 Business decisions are technical to the extent that the employment
of labor power and purchasing of material inputs are technically conditioned (that
is, production techniques are represented by the labor and material input coefficients
in the input-output matrix of the economy). It goes without saying that techniques
available at a point in time is socially and historically generated.
By a historical decision is meant that one decision follows another cumulatively, rather
than multiple decisions are made simultaneously. For example, following purchasing
decisions which lead to the costing structure through accounting practices, the price of
product is determined according to a pricing principle practiced by the enterprise with
the expectation of making target profits (Lee 1998). Decisions on dividend payouts,
on debt payments (or renewing debts), on retention and internal finance, on external
finance, and on the acquisition of financial assets follow consequently.5 Given these de-
cisions, the level of investment determines the level of profits (Wood 1975, Ch. 2). As
a going concern the business enterprise thus makes various decisions that are unceasing
sequential actions flowing through historical time. Investment and financing decisions
link the present production period of the enterprise (or the current accounting period)
to the future period. This implies that the ambiguous and ahistorical differentiation
between the short-period and the long-period is irrelevant in historical time or insofar
as a going concern is considered. For example, the Sraffian long-period position or
the center of gravity itself changes constantly. In other words, the presumed conver-
gence between the short-period position and the long-period position is logically and
historically problematic (Lee 1985; 1996; D’Olrando 2005; Lee and Jo 2010).
Business decisions are also social since they involve other social agency (other enter-
4Decisions are also made culturally and ideologically. Conventions and norms prevailing in the
industry, in the economy, and in the community in which the enterprise is operating will figure in
the business decision-making process since the business enterprise is a social agency. Moreover, its
capitalist ethos, business ethics, and values in general will be the basis of any business decisions.
For more general discussion of a “complex technological society” in which the business enterprise is
embedded, see Hayden (1982; 2011).
5Enterprise decisions do not have to follow in this particular order. For example, a dividend payout
ratio in reference to the owners of the corporation may be determined before other decisions are made.
Decisions are enterprise specific as well as contingent upon business cycles. Decisions change as the
expectations of economic conditions change.
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Figure 1: Monetary Social Provisioning Process
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prises as suppliers of inputs, working class households, the state, financial enterprises)
and their actions at every stage in business. For instance, a single material input or an
individual labor power input alone cannot produce an output. Inputs are productive
once they are put together in the system of production. That is, marginal productivity
has no meaning in the social process of production and individual inputs are not pro-
ductive in themselves. In addition, with the going enterprise and the sequential-social
process of production, the concept of reoccurring direct and overhead costs is socially
constructed. And so are accounting practices (Lee and Jo 2010).
Figure 1 illustrates key business decisions made in an accounting period in relation to
other agency in the economy (Note that arrows in the figure indicate flows of phys-
ical goods or money.).6 Some significant theoretical-methodological implications are
demonstrated below.
6A more detailed illustration of the economy as a whole from the heterodox economic perspective
is presented in Lee (2011b). While Figure 1 is a simplification of Lee’s model, it captures, as described
below, key theoretical implications that are relevant to the present issue in question.
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2.2 Welfare of the working class depends on the ruling class
Agency makes an array of sequential decisions, while markets or other structures do
not. In addition to enterprise decisions described above, working class households
make consumption (and saving) decisions. Since employment decisions are made by
the business enterprise, wage incomes are mainly dependent upon the enterprise deci-
sion to produce outputs (that is, C ′ the social product). Since the business enterprise
decides the amount of the social surplus (that is, consumption goods, fixed investment
goods, and government goods and services) and wages are given to workers in the
process of production, households do not determine how much and what consumption
goods to purchase consumption goods given budget constraints as in neoclassical eco-
nomics. That is, consumer sovereignty is misleading in the capitalist social provisioning
process. Households are given consumption goods and services, but not all the goods
and services produced in the economy are available to them. They choose among a
narrow range of consumption goods corresponding to their income class. Income effects
are thus dominant, whereas substitution effects across the classes of goods and services
are limited. Moreover, the class structure of the capitalist society is maintained by
creating wage incomes to be used to purchase consumption (or wage) goods, and by
creating a hierarchical structure of these goods (Lavoie 1992; Drakopoulos 1994; Lee
2011b). What follows from this is that the welfare of working class households depends
upon the decisions made by the ruling class—the capitalist class and the state; more
specifically, 1) private business enterprises’ decision to expand their productive capa-
bilities (that is, investment demand), 2) the state’s decision to spend its tax money on
surplus goods (that is, government demand), 3) the state’s decision to transfer incomes
from the capitalist class to the working class, 4) the state’s decision to provide public
goods at the price lower that they are produced by private business enterprises, and
5) the state’s decisions to employ workers in the government sector (for example, an
employment of last resort program). In the class-based capitalist economy, therefore,
effective demand (1 and 2) coupled with the welfare state (3, 4, and 5) protects the
vested interests of the ruling class and reproduces the entire system (Jo 2012). How-
ever, it is not to say that capitalist economy and society as whole is stable. This is
point is further elaborated later.7
2.3 The capitalist state is not a benevolent welfare purveyor
The enduring structure of the social provisioning process and the flow of goods and
money within the process thus require an appropriate vision of the state. As indicated
7Trade unions, trade associations, cartels, and similar market governance organizations are not
discussed here but they play important roles in determining or influencing the wage rate, market price
and profit mark-ups.
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above, unlike the commonly accepted view of the state among heterodox economists—
that is, the “benevolent purveyor of cradle-to-the grave security” (Hill 1964, 395), the
state figures in the social provisioning process as the tax authority that redistributes
wages and profits, as the giant public consumer who is capable of commanding a
significant amount of the social surplus nearly without budget constraints, and as the
welfare purveyor (but not necessarily in the interest of the working class, but mostly in
the interest of the ruling class since the welfare state would primarily protect the social
order by stabilizing the social provisioning process). In addition, due to its constituent
role in the composition of effective demand, if there is no social expenditure the effective
demand of the economy would be significantly below the level that is necessary to
sustain the social provisioning process (Jo 2012).
2.4 Surplus production decisions animate flows of production,
incomes, and funds
The preeminence of profits over other types incomes (wage incomes, government rev-
enues, dividends, and capital gains) reinforces the importance of decisions to produce
the social surplus. The decisions to produce consumption goods, fixed investment
goods, and government goods and services determine the level and composition of the
total social product and hence the level of employment through the output-employment
multiplier. Planned or effective demand for fixed investment goods, in particular, gen-
erates the flow of the production of intermediate inputs, the flow of the production of
fixed investment goods, and the flow of funds to finance demand for fixed investment
goods. Therefore investment generates profits in the form of fixed investment goods
(denominated by the state money) and profits are divided into dividend payouts, debt
payments, and retained earnings based on enterprise’s strategic decisions to grow and
survive. That is, enterprise savings are generated by investment, rather than the other
way around. In reality, households also make savings out of wage incomes that are
dependent upon enterprise investment and production decisions. In a simple monetary
production economy illustrated above, increasing household saving means that less con-
sumption goods are produced and fewer workers are employed—that is the economy
is unsustainable. To avoid this problem, theoretically and practically, there must exist
a government running deficits. Government deficits further imply that financial assets
(e.g., government bonds) and hence the banking sector are inseparable parts of the
economy. The amount of loanable funds is, however, not constrained by the amount
of gross savings because the banking sector would create funds/credits on enterprises’
and government’s demands (Eichner 1976; Lee 2011a; Lee and Jo 2011).
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2.5 Prices are strategically determined
That the social provisioning process is a sequential process through historical time
implies that the enterprise decision to produce a certain volume of surplus goods is
followed by the price decision. In contrast to neoclassical exchange economy in which
quantity and price are simultaneously determined, they are determined by different
mechanisms that are established technically, historically, and socially. Therefore, the
price mechanism is to be identified technically, historically, and socially. Empirical
studies show that business enterprises use different pricing principles and industry
prices are made to be stable by enterprises themselves, by market organizations (such
as cartels, trade associations), and by government price regulations (Means 1939; Lee
1998, 211; Fabiani, Gattulli and Sabbatini 2007; Melmies 2010). In the real world,
prices do not clear markets and the business enterprise takes into account growth and
expansion of itself in determining the product price. That is, prices are strategically
determined so as to enable the enterprise to finance the desired level of investment
necessary through retained earnings (Eichner 1976, 196-200). Prices do not allocate
resources, but they are set to gain access to the social provisioning process and to
reproduce the business enterprise (Lee and Jo 2011, 865)
2.6 Cost accounting practices define profits and incomes
Strategically determined product prices require cost accounting practices that 1) keep
track of reoccurring cost items (that is, intermediate inputs, labor power skills, and
fixed investment goods) and one-time expenses, 2) categorize direct (variable) and
overhead (fixed) inputs, 3) determine the unit cost of output and depreciation, and
4) define (in the sense of accounting) profits and business incomes. One important
implication of such accounting systems that have been developed by the business en-
terprise is that “fixed investment goods are not viewed as commodities to be sold on
the market for revenue purposes; rather the going enterprise views them as essential
non-commodities for maintaining the going plant whose historical value is considered
a recoverable cost to be charged against revenue before determining business income”
(Lee and Jo 2010, 4).
2.7 The banking sector is parasitic
Although the banking sector does not produce physical goods, it is essential in the
monetary production economy since it helps producing physical goods and generating
monetary profits by providing the business enterprise with necessary funds. Since its
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establishment at the early stage of capitalism, its operation, and its survival and growth
are fully dependent upon the non-financial business sector, the banking sector is thus
parasitic. Moreover, it is “business” as opposed to “industry” in the Veblenian sense
(Veblen 1904). In the contemporary capitalist economy the total value of final outputs
in the banking sector (that is, the FIRE sector) is as large as that of the manufacturing
sector.8 As illustrated in the figure above, the demand for external funds should be
determined after the business enterprise makes investment decisions and the decisions
on dividend payouts and retained earnings. Since the supply of funds is not scarce but
dependent upon the demand for funds, the financial market cannot be represented by a
supply-demand mechanism which assumes the scarcity of funds and thereby the price
of such funds as a scarcity index.
3 Financing Investment under Uncertainty and In-
stability
As discussed and illustrated above, financing decisions cannot be separated from other
business decisions, related agency, and the banking sector. It is the business decision
to produce surplus goods and services that animates the entire flows of inputs, money,
and goods and services. Consequently, the social provisioning process is going and
the life of enterprises, agents, and organizations continues. In this light, the business
enterprise is a “controlling force in industry” and as a result of its routine and momen-
tous business practices the business enterprise “set[s] the pace and determine[s] the
direction of movements of the rest” (Veblen 1904, 2-3).
Let us look closely at the financing and investment decision mechanism within the
enterprise. In order for the enterprise to achieve its long term goal, concrete strategic
plans are to be put into place. Assuming the growth of the business enterprise in
terms of sales, the market share, or capital accumulation is the ultimate goal, an
appropriate investment project is proposed by the management and then is evaluated
with regard to enterprise’s earning capabilities that form the expectation of cash flows,
of a rate of profits, and of sales. Management’s perception of the potential riskiness of
a proposed investment project varies. Riskiness is evaluated in terms of, for example,
the failure of achieving a target return, a variation in returns, an uncertain payback
period, uncertain market potential, entering an inexperienced area, or a success ratio
(Petty, Scott and Bird 1975, 166). If expected cash flows exceed an expected risk, the
approval of the proposed project is granted. Then the project is to be financed either
internally or externally. If the project is to be financed through internally accumulated
8$4,515,756.2 mil. in the FIRE sector and $5,012,369.7 mil. in the manufacturing sector in 2008
in the US. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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funds, the enterprise has to make strategic decisions on price. This is likely the case
if product and financial market conditions are murky or perceived riskiness is rising.
In the face of constantly changing market environment, the business enterprise needs
to stabilize the market by administering prices, by holding reserved capacities, and by
other means of market governance. These means lend themselves to generating cash
flows that are crucial for survival and growth. To set the price it is necessary for the
enterprise to have an accounting practice that measures and estimates reoccurring costs
and one-time expenses as accurate as possible. Such an interdependent and sequential
decision-making process is illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Pricing, Financing, and Investment
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Most decisions are made under uncertainty. That is to say, “[b]usiness as usual” means
“[u]ncertainty and retardation as usual” (Veblen 1934, 300). Thus “[w]hat man can
do easily is what they do habitually, and this decides what they can think and know
easily”(Veblen 1898, 195). Expectations with differing degrees direct decisions and are
influenced by rules of thumb, animal spirits, habitual actions, or entrepreneurs’ natural
propensities which are in turn based upon commonly received conventions, norms,
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and habits of thoughts (Keynes 1936; Kalecki 1971). This means that “[i]n a world
of FU [fundamental uncertainty] there are no probability distributions that infallibly
represent the future. The future is not “out there” waiting to be discovered; rather
future depends on the actions we take now in light of our own fallible expectations
of it” (Crotty 1996, 343). Therefore, uncertainty giving rise to instability requires
acting agents to make an array of strategic actions that possibly reduce instability.
One important means to do so is to keep accumulating internal funds (of course the
actual amount of cash depends on actual demand by other agents).
There is significant evidence that the business enterprise relies chiefly on retained earn-
ings in financing investment. According to Corbett and Jenkinson (1997), internal
financing is the main source of fixed investments in four advanced economies (Japan,
Germany, UK, and US) during 1974-1990. German corporations, for instance, rely
on internal finance by 78.9% (Japan 69.9%, UK 93.3%, and US 96.1%). Moreover,
in spite of the difference in institutional arrangements like the development of capital
markets, the corporate governance system, innovations, and the globalization of finan-
cial markets, the dominance of internal funds over external funds appears to be quite
stable over the period in consideration. Similarly, Mayer (1988) finds that net external
finance (loans, deposit, short-term securities) of physical investment during 1970-1985
is 42% (Japan), 37% (France), 25% (US), 12% (Germany), and 5% (UK). Brealey and
Meyers (2000) also report that U.S non-financial corporations financed about 90% of
their investment from internally generated funds in the 1990s.
More recently, in the last quarter of 2011 the proportion of internal funds to gross
investment is 85% for U.S. non-financial corporations as a whole (internal funds to
fixed investment is 122%). The magnitude of internal funds is relatively stable over
the past six years notwithstanding the financial crisis, whereas total external funds
are highly unstable and pro-cyclical (see Figure 3). Right after the beginning of the
financial crisis in 2008, external funds declined sharply. Since then external funds
have not recovered from the pre-crisis level. Insofar as the period after the 2008 crisis
is concerned, the positive relationship between external funds and fixed investment is
hardly discerned. That is, internal financing is the main source of investment especially
when economy is in recession or economic instability is growing.
Enterprise financing behavior reflected in the data runs counter to received theories of
finance and investment. Firstly, the Modigliani-Miller theorem posits that the source
of financing (or capital structure) does not matter to the valuation of a corporation
if it engages in a competitive (or efficient) capital markets with perfect knowledge
(Modigliani and Miller 1958).9 Aside from a set of problematic assumptions, in light
9By assumption, retained earnings are considered equivalent to the issue of stocks if the objective
of management is to maximize the value of shares through the efficient capital market. The theorem
thus implies that there is no difference between equity/internal financing and debt/external financ-
ing. Modigliani and Miller (1958) also take into account uncertainty in the context of corporation’s
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Figure 3: Internal Financing and External Financing in the US, 2005-2011
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of fundamental uncertainty and corporate strategic actions in the face of instability,
the Modigliani-Miller theorem has no relevance. The theorem is not actually about
enterprise financing decision mechanism. Rather, it is about how the efficient market
determines financing since the rational corporate behavior would always result in the
optimal capital structure (Eichner 1987, 486; Wood 1975, 40-1).
Secondly, a similar, if not the same, criticism applies to the heterodox macroeconomic
account that the level of investment is determined by supply and demand prices of
investment goods (Keynes 1936, 248; Minsky 1986, Ch.8). What is assumed here is
external financing as the determinant of investment and thereby as the driving force of
financial instability. Consequently, heterodox macroeconomists have paid little atten-
‘rational’ decision-making behavior. The concept of uncertainty is of course very neoclassical. In the
model uncertainly is reduced a random variable (that is, the mean value over time of the stream of
profits) with a probability distribution (265).
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tion to internal financing, although they admit that both internal financing and external
financing are complementary (Davidson 1972, 348; Lavoie 1992, 109). Arguably, such
a ‘financial (market) theory of investment’ is not convincing to the extent that it bases
itself on the Marshallian framework in which resource scarcity and marginal produc-
tivity are implied (Harcourt 2004; King 1995, 3), and that the business enterprise is
reduced to its balance sheet (as in Minsky 2004, 98). These two reasons point to the
lack of proper (that is, heterodox) microfoundations of macroeconomic theory.10
By contrast, the point made in the paper is that since instability is an inescapable
part of capitalist economy, enterprises should make strategic decisions about internal
cash flows so as to contain vulnerability in their business activities (that is, micro-
instability) as well as the instability in markets and economy as whole (that is, macro-
instability). As illustrated above, closely tied pricing-financing-investment mechanisms
at the enterprise level imply that the business enterprise does not passively take prices
(of intermediate capital goods, of surplus goods, and of financial assets), but actively
makes prices so as to achieve its long term goals. Moreover, business enterprises orga-
nize themselves into various forms such as trade associations and cartels for the sake
of governing the individual markets and, hence, reducing micro-instability. The state
regulates markets to reduce micro- and macro-instability and thereby to protect private
enterprises (Fligstein 1990; Prechel 2000; Jo 2011a).
It is also well known that the more the enterprise borrows from the banking sector,
the more vulnerable to instability it becomes (Kalecki 1971, 105-6). This hypothesis
needs elaboration. Small or newly established enterprises perhaps have no choice but
to borrow external funds because they have limited internally generated funds (Car-
penter and Peterson 2002). Big corporations are, however, not much constrained by
the availability of both internal and external funds since ‘megacorps’ have accumulated
enough capital in cash or in assets that can be quickly liquefied and since lenders are
likely to grant loans to those already big corporations (Eichner 2000, 109; Lavoie 1992,
109). Thus it may well be that existing financial conditions evaluated by creditors
along with other considerations such as conventions and social relations between cred-
itors and debtors are also important factors in making finance decisions. Perhaps for
most enterprises the strategic way to cope with radical uncertainty is to keep generat-
ing retained earnings as a cushion of safety, rather than relying on inherently unstable
financial markets. In addition, enterprises are forced to control the market through
cartels and trade associations, creating demand for products, innovating products and
related process.11 These means of market control of course are not sufficient but nec-
10As for heterodox microfoundations on which this paper is based, I recommend you to refer to
Jo (2007), Lee (2011a;b), and Lee and Jo (2011). For the counter-argument to heterodox micro-
foundations from a heterodox macroeconomic perspective as well as an extensive theoretical and
methodological review of the “microfoundations dogma”, see King (2012).
11This implies that “free markets” do not exist as long as uncertainty and instability are matter of
course in real life. Furthermore, the business enterprise has to set up a structure of a decision-making
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essary to survive and growth. Such a purposeful action might end up with unintended
consequences.
4 Conclusion
This essay started out with the clarification of uncertainty and instability that are cen-
tral to heterodox economics. Fundamental uncertainty is the nature of socio-economic
reality. It cannot be eliminated; nor can it be reduced to risk that is a subjective in-
terpretation of outer conditions. Instability is the outcome of fundamental uncertainty
through agent actions. The confusion between risk and uncertainty makes neoclassical
economics incapable of providing the explanation of the ‘fundamental’ instability of
the capitalist social provisioning process—or perhaps neoclassical economists are not
concerned with the instability of markets, of the system, and of society. In radical con-
trast to neoclassical vision of economy, heterodox economists have explained instability
inherent to the capitalist social provisioning process embedded in the hierarchical class
structure of society. The class system implies socio-economic power of controlling the
social provisioning process in favor of those who hold dominant power.
Putting uncertainty and instability in the context of the monetary social provisioning
process enabled us to provide a new light on financing behavior of the business enter-
prise. Within the enterprise all key decisions are made technically, historically, and
socially. In particular, fundamental uncertainty requires enterprises to make strategic
decisions. The enterprise decision to produce social surplus animates flows of produc-
tion, income, and funds in the economy. To continue and grow business over historical
time, the enterprise makes investments. Investment requires financing. And financing
requires pricing and accounting practices. These all enterprise actions are linked to-
gether in an indeterministic manner—that is, the monetary social provisioning process
is open; all agents making a living the process are therefore make decision strategically
and deliberately.
Then how does the enterprise finance investments? Statistical data support on the one
hand that internally generated funds are the main source of investment especially when
economy is in recession or economic instability is increasing. On the other hand, the
positive relationship between external finance and fixed investment is hardly discerned.
This finding has led to a critique of not only the Modigliani-Miller theorem but also
the heterodox macroeconomic account of investment and finance that lays exclusive
emphasis on external financing and the determination of investment in the financial
process so as to deal with changing socio-economic environment. That is, the reason that the business
enterprise exists and flourishes is not simply because it is capable of transaction costs arising in market
transactions.
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market.
Alternatively, it is argued that the business enterprise makes all the efforts to reduce
both micro-instability and macro-instability. In so doing, it is essential for them to
generate internal funds, rather than relying on inherently unstable financial markets,
in order to cope with instability and uncertainty.
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